In the Era of Uncertainties: Middle Power Politics in a Multipolar World

Poornima Vijaya

Email: prvijaya@jgu.edu.in

PhD Candidate, Jindal School of International Affairs,India

ORCID: 0000-0001-5774-8392

Abstract

The Asia-Pacific region has transformed from a colonial past to an emerging economic power

hub, thus bringing fluidity to its definition. The Asia Pacific region is a powerhouse of

economic, technological, demographic, and social growth, drawing the attention of several

scholars to the distinctive hotbed of great power competition and the emergence of a multipolar

world order. The article studies the rise of middle powers by understanding the nature of their

foreign policy behaviour by re-examining the regional security complexes of the Asia-Pacific

region. In trying to bridge the imbalance of power and regionality, the author argues that the

geopolitical flux in the security environment has severe implications for regional integration

and cooperation. Countries in the Asia-Pacific region intend to constructively engage in

widening their multi track diplomacy through multi-layered alignments with numerous formal

and informal agencies and thus create multiple centres of power, influence, and order. The

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and ASEAN-plus continue to present

themselves as indispensable in order to promote converged strategic hedging, scilicet, pursuing

bilateral, minilateral, and multilateral efforts on the chessboard of geostrategic competition of-

Low Politics, including supply chains, trade production, cooperation on public health, and

infrastructure development; and High Politics, implying defence partnerships and military

modernisation agreements. Nonetheless, strategic hedging is not a preferred option for

competing powers as it provides these middle power agencies (in bilateral, minilateral, and

multilateral) with space, a platform, and channels for pragmatic, cooperative, yet cautious

partnerships. However, the region has a myriad of options for tackling the complex nature of

ASEAN consensus and self-help governance, thus overlooking its functions of regional

security diplomacy and aptitudes of prioritising and advancing the member states

internationally.

Keywords: Middle Power Diplomacy, Asian Century, Multipolarity, ASEAN Centrality,

Regionality

Introduction

The historical dominance of western discourses on the hegemonic power system ebbs away

with the Asian resurgence, presenting commentators and scholars ample opportunities to

contemplate the ideational, structural, social, institutional, and domestic changes in the

international system with the emergence of the so-called ‘Asian Century’ (David 2007, 1).

Most of the national histories encompassed the history of its kings, the two World Wars, the

great economic depression, proxy wars, the Cold War, and such in the past century narrowed

its scope to realist studies; thus, world history suffered. It is popular to evaluate the interstate

relations of the world system in which the superpowers compete and cooperate, rarely with

each other than the rest (Griveaud 2011; White 2013; Allison 2018). As debates around the

complexities of power and system developed, the traditional distinction between 'the great and

the small' bawled for the re-examination of the concepts in international relations, thus blurring

the binaries with the unprecedented proliferation of 'middle' or 'medium' states in the past five

decades (Cooper 2013, 964). Trends of like-minded groupings in the past century stimulated

new ideas in the early 1960s on the nature and role of small states (recently decolonised powers)

and middle powers (based on the 'functional' idea and 'behaviour' such as Canada, Australia,

Germany, etc.) in the bipolar world order (Cooper 2013, 978).

Throughout history, several scholars have remained divided on their definitions of the concept

of middle powers. Middle powers have shaped an inextricable part of the new world order.

Great powers continually shape the international world order. Kenneth Waltz, a neo-realist

theorist, reasoned that international structures are defined in terms of their units in an anarchical

realm and fluctuate with substantial changes in the number and influence of great powers

(Waltz 1990). In this context, middle powers are perceived to be caught passively amidst the

power rivalries. There are clear patterns of discourses in middle power theory indicating a

greater prominence to realist, neo-realist, and the security studies camp, thereby concentrating

their arguments on material capability, possible alignments, free trade, and cooperation in a

hubs and spokes system (Shin 2015). This reiterates that most of the scholarship in International

Relations (IR) has been centred around the realist understanding of interest and behaviour

(Acharya 1997). Mainstream international relations theories discount countries outside the core

of the West, thus making such discourses a mere abstraction of the Westphalian straitjacket.

Furthermore, international relations continue to parochially defend, promote, and celebrate the

vested interests of the West as more minor and middle powers seek to uphold such governance

models as its 'ideal normative referent' on the world stage (Cooper 2013, 980; Chapnick 1999;

Nolte 2010; Patience 2014; Efstathopoulos 2018; Goh 2020). Against this backdrop, this article

re-examines the role of middle and small powers amidst the multipolarity of the 21st century.

The first section of the article discusses the rise of middle powers in multilateral institutions.

The following section revisits the regional security complexes of the Asia-Pacific region

attempting to bridge the imbalance of power and regionality. Finally, the author argues that the

exceptional flux in the security environment accounts for severe implications for regional

integration and cooperation. The Asia-Pacific nations intend to constructively broaden their

multi track diplomacy through multi-layered alliances with numerous formal and informal

agencies, creating multiple centres of power, influence, and order. The Association of

Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and ASEAN-plus continue to present themselves as

indispensable in promoting converged strategic hedging, scilicet, and pursuing bilateral,

minilateral, and multilateral efforts on the chessboard of geostrategic competition of- Low

Politics, implying supply chains, trade production, public health cooperation, and infrastructure

development; and, High Politics, implying defence partnerships and military modernisation

agreements (Vijaya 2023). Nonetheless, strategic hedging is not a preferred option for

competing powers as it provides these agencies with space, a platform, and channels for

pragmatic, cooperative, yet cautious partnerships. However, ASEAN is ever so often dismissed

for the complex nature of ‘ASEAN Consensus’, thus, overlooking its functions of regional

security diplomacy and aptitudes of prioritising and promoting the member states

internationally (Baviera and Maramis 2017, 3,4; Connelly 2022).

The Rise of Middle Powers

Asia-Pacific, as a region, transformed from a colonial past to an emerging economic power

hub, thus bringing fluidity to its definition. Unlike flying geese, the region is like an earthbound

amoeba with economic, technological, demographic, and social growth, drawing the attention

of several scholars to the distinctive and dynamic nature of this region for great power

competition and the emergence of multipolar world order. The contemporary debates in new

and emerging middle powers echo an objective of some nations for a middle power repute, as

this label has a status in the social order and is of geopolitical resonance (Jordaan 2003). As

Nolte elucidates,

"While traditional middle powers are, first and foremost, defined by their role in

international politics, the new middle powers are, first of all, regional powers (or

regional leaders) and, in addition, middle powers (with regard to their power

resources) on a global scale. For a better discrimination between middle powers and

regional powers it makes sense to differentiate between a leading power, which is

defined by means of its power resources, self-conception, and leadership. Leadership

refers to political influence in diplomatic forums, which could be exercised by middle

powers. Regional powers usually combine leadership and power over resources”

(Nolte 2010, 890).

Therefore, the need to consider the growing impact of middle powers, both individually and

collectively, in the regional systemic order has increased tremendously, even more so with the

emerging bipolarity amidst the signs of a new Cold War between the US and China. Indeed,

examining foreign policy behaviours and exploring the uniqueness of the middle power identity

of the secondary states in the international system. ‘A newly emerging middle is changing the

global balance of power’ (Scott, Hulme and Hau 2010, 3). The reconstitution of the traditional

conceptualisations of middle powers has led to new ideational, relational, and behavioural

models of analysis; thus, the roles such states play are evolving with rapid geopolitical

developments in regions around the world.

“The role and purpose of the middle power today look rather different. The institutions

that middle powers create have been less effective than imagined, as inclusive

multilateralism has been eclipsed by great power leadership in trade agreements (e.g.,

TPP and RECP), alliances have a stronger gravitational pull, security tensions, and

uncertainties are rising and above all, a shifting balance of power has brought

geopolitical competition to the fore” (Evans 2016, 49,50).

Middle power research accelerated with the end of the Cold War. Several works laid new

foundations to deconstruct middle power behaviour, making significant contributions to

delineating the middle power concept through the thoroughfare of diplomatic behavioural

patterns, therefore constantly engaging in 'Middlepowermanship' (Cox 1989, 824;

Efstathopoulos 2018). Literature on middle powers has predominantly focused its discourses

on positional and behavioural models, thus producing relative novelty in the ideational aspects

of middle-power diplomacy. The former identifies middle powers through material capacity

and activism in diplomatic behaviour, respectively. At the same time, the latter amasses

questions on domestic politics, history, multicultural societies, and public discourse, driving

their present Middlepowermanship (Cox 1989, 824) along with other crucial criteria such as

good international citizenship through normative policy approaches, penchant for

multilateralism/exclusive minilateralism, effective domestic and international leadership

assuming roles such as facilitators and bridge-builders, perform niche diplomacy to secure

systemic influence, catalysts of cooperation building like-minded coalitions, providing

intellectual and innovative diplomacy shaping bargaining skills and negotiating outcomes and

finally, their perceived status in the systemic levels (Holbraad 1984; Carr 2014; Nolte 2010,

Cox 1989; Efstathopoulos 2018).

Subsequently, in recent times, middle power definitions enveloped a complex composition of

global governance, thus bringing the middle powers to the ‘high table with an equivalency of

bigger states’ (Cooper and Dal 2016, 523). With the incorporation of middle powers into the

system through multilateral mechanisms such as G20, this wave is characterised by the

diversity in the composition of the middle powers. The traditional middle powers in the

international system are presently matched and, to a certain extent, even outnumbered by the

emerging middle powers, also referred to as the NEXT 11 (Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran,

Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Turkey, South Korea, and Vietnam). This is, thus,

making the ‘previous category defining middle powers like Canada and Australia may now

appear as aberrant’ (Gilley 2011, 254). The new wave of Middlepowermanship and the

accompanying scholarships is a product of transformations in the regional subsystems and the

international order.

The competition for dominance between the US and China has resulted in the emergence of

middle power agencies as the arena for their geostrategic rivalry (Hass 2021). The crucial

question driving the middle power discourse in the 21st century is to understand the degrees of

middle power engagement, individually and collectively, in bridging, mediating, and coalition-

building between these rivals normatively through institutional, regional, or international

forums. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, former Indonesian president, stated that the middle and

small powers in the international system could help lock these powers in a durable architecture

through a multiplicity of instruments creating scope for evolutions of polarities in the system

structures ranging from unipolarity to bipolarity to multipolarity (Varisco 2013).

"The configuration of system structure- multipolar, bipolar, unipolar (hegemonic)-

defined by the number and relationships among the "great powers" of the moment

dictates the context of constraints and opportunity in which the remaining states in the

system must function. They constantly confront the security dilemmas created by their

global and regional relationships to the major powers and must determine their

alliance stances accordingly" (Neack 2000, 14).

The reshaping of the world order towards diffused, heterogeneous, plurilateral, and multipolar

necessitates the fundamental rethinking of their autonomous dynamics and the need to navigate

the changing geometry of power. Therefore, it is reiterating that the study of middle power

agencies is at a crucial juncture with significant influence on shaping the international systems.

The Chinese rise to revisionist status and de facto regional hegemony in the Asia-Pacific and

its peripheries- Southeast Asia, East Asia, and the Western Pacific, has transformed these

regions into geopolitical theatres of instability (Goh 2005). The US and its major allies – the

UK, France, Japan, and Australia, have pivoted their defence and national security strategies

towards preventing uncontested and unchecked Chinese power from rising further in Asia and

the Indo-Pacific (Heydarian 2019; Vučetić 2021). The region's economic success created the

emerging multipolar world order, in which, to maintain its influence, the US is presently

doubling down on the hubs-and-spokes system of network alliances and intensifying its

competition with China (Ford and Goldgeier 2021).

More than three decades ago, the US emerged as the world's superpower; however, it is also

important for us to note discourses on the looming hegemonic decline of the US over the last

two decades. The advent of non-traditional security threats since 9/11 has continually exposed

the deep-rooted problems in American security. The Biden administration, which ordered the

US withdrawal from Afghanistan and turned away from the world, has cast horrifying images

of desperate Afghan civilians attempting to flee authoritarian rule after the West-backed

government in Afghanistan collapsed in August 2021 (Fukuyama 2021). Growing accusations

of isolationism, unreliability and domestic fissures in American weakness contributed to the

fading influence of American unipolarity. The gift of hegemony brought by the collapse of the

Soviet Union in 1991 was misread, as the Americans pursued endless wars, interventions, and

pressure campaigns, resulting in expensive divisions in popular support within America.

During this crucial transitional period, the world witnessed the Russian military's

reaffirmations and the Chinese economic and technological prowess. America must re-evaluate

its strategies for preserving its primacy in an evolving world. However, as much has been

written about great powers, discourses on the changing role of middle powers are

comparatively very few, especially in the multipolar world order that aptitudes describe the

rest of the 21st Century (Mazarr 2018).

One Region, Many Choices

With a multi-faceted approach, middle powers with greater potential balance the rivalries. In

contrast, some choose to hedge with China in order to reap economic gains alongside

bandwagoning with the US to contain the rising influence of China in the region. Others choose

from a range of options such as neutrality to constructive engagements, appeasements to

informal regional alliance systems. Instead of dreading entrapment alliances with the US,

middle powers have played a crucial role in manoeuvring the rivalry to advance their regional

interests (Ikenberry 2014). They constructively manage relations between the US and China

by essentially acting as diffusers to enmesh China and the US in regional security. Middle

powers in the region are proactive at engaging with each other to augment their influence in

regional concerns. Despite the criticisms and inadequacies, ASEAN had been insisting on

centrality in its pursuit of regional leadership (Acharya 1997).

Scilicet, middle powers have a myriad of options to strike a balance in the Sino-US strategic

rivalry. In order to create stability and maintain status-quo in the region, the middle powers are

stepping up and in some aspects need to work towards- expanding coordination on shared

interests through new deals and creation of ad hoc institutions; strengthening economic

resilience by inoculating themselves from economic pressures and weaponising economic

interdependence; retorting to acts of coercion collectively against Chinese assertiveness in the

South China Sea; signalling their resolve for defence partnerships as the middle powers in the

Asia-Pacific region recognise that cheap security is over; refraining from zero-sum competition

whilst competition in the international order is inevitable, if balanced with the objective of

cooperation will reduce the vulnerability; Striding against the orotundity of with us or against

us debates, as it looks like today, neither side will win in the contest for primacy in Asia Pacific

and finally, making efforts towards bridging the US and China competition into rules, that will

promote plurilateral strategies and a preferred stability along with an equilibrium balance of

power (Medcalf 2019; Vijaya 2021; 2023).

Middle powers are now refurbishing their strategy from vying for the balance of influence

instead of contending for power. The security dynamics began to change in 2009 when China,

on one hand, and middle powers like Vietnam and the Philippines, on the other, was broiled in

intensive territorial disputes with each other in the South China Sea. Despite engaging in

intensive economic relations, Asian-Pacific states, such as Vietnam and the Philippines, have

been cautious and have been vociferously critical of Chinese assertiveness in the South China

Sea. To balance the security domain in this area, the Philippines sought reassurance to

strengthen its defence ties with the US and reprimand Chinese claims in the South China Sea

at the International Arbitration Tribunal. Conversely, Vietnam intensified its bilateral security

ties with the US under the US-Vietnam Defence Memorandum of Understanding (Lemahieu

2019). Australia, Singapore, and Indonesia, despite their policy of Total Defence, are

increasing their defence budgets since 2018 up to 60 per cent to secure the regional security

infrastructure amidst the rising dichotomous rivalry between the US and China (Salerno-

Garthwaite 2022). Hence, it would be wrong to assume middle powers have little to no

influence in the regional and world order. While these powers are vulnerable to systemic

shocks, they have large stakes in the international system. Unlike small powers with no vested

interests or stakes, middle powers, on the contrary, are attempting to seek relative advantages

from both revisionist powers, like China, and status-quo powers, like the US. While such

arguments emphasise material capability and hedging as a preferred modus operandi,

nevertheless, such discourses fail to take into consideration the normative influences, cultural

distinctiveness, and social practices influencing foreign policy behaviours echoing similar

dilemmas faced by middle and small powers in Asia-Pacific (Friedberg 2018; Goh 2020). The

region is witnessing emergent signs of limited cooperation and long-term rivalry between

China and the US, thus generating increased uncertainty in domestic and international affairs

(Fels 2017). Such dilemmas deepen competition in both military and non-military spheres,

intensifying high and low politics and presenting the smaller and middle powers with

opportunities but equal challenges to endure (Stanzel 2018). However, reflecting on the

pluralistic nature of foreign policy behaviours indicates several approaches of neutrality,

autonomy, appeasement, and constructive engagements. Strategic autonomy for middle powers

like Malaysia and Vietnam is imperative in bilateralism, regionalism, and internationalism. A

neutral Malaysia is vital to preserving long-term prosperity and stability in Asia. It is in the

region's best interest, its integration, and the hegemonic powers, namely the US and China,

thus remaining reluctant to choose sides in this rivalry actively (Milner 2017).

In the longer run, middle powers are not limited to mediating or arbiter roles but develop in

three ways: 1) Assuring the liberal-democratic order; 2) seeking to preserve the order between

competing great powers; or 3) playing as 'counter-hegemonic' forces, or 'spoilers' (Buzan and

Goh 2020, 295). In this transitioning world order, the G20 platform allows middle powers of

different hues to cooperate. For instance, with concerns over the South China Sea dispute, the

study submits that as middle powers, Australia, South Korea, and Indonesia, Vietnam can join

their resources so that they ‘can develop and deepen spoke-to-spoke networks and decrease the

scope for hub countries to shape the regional order unilaterally’ (Baldwin 2009, 6). It is

predicted that middle powers in the Asia-Pacific are committed to multilateralism and will

work collectively to take responsibility for regional and global security (Cooper 2011). A world

order in a transition phase provides several challenges to middle power countries. Their

response to global shifts in the influence and power of the US and China remains a crucial

challenge. Therefore, middle powers in the region face a constant dilemma between whether

to defend the status quo, adapt to the changing circumstances, or actively shape a new world

order.

Redefining Regional Security Complexes in a Multipolar World

As previously alluded, power in international politics is relative, and hence, any scrutiny of

middle power conceptualisations begins with considerations of great powers as well as the

comparative advantage of middle powers in their local regions relative to other, smaller powers

in their respective geographic spheres. Understanding ‘regional security complexes’ (RSCs)

and their specific dynamics, as introduced by Buzan and Waever (2003, 40), is critical to a

proper conceptualisation of middle powers from regional perspectives:

“Processes of securitization and thus the degree of security interdependence are more

intense between the actors inside such complexes than they are between actors inside

the complex and those outside it. Security complexes may well be extensively penetrated

by the global powers, but their regional dynamics nonetheless have a substantial degree

of autonomy from the patterns set by the global powers. To paint a proper portrait of

global security, one needs to understand both of these levels independently, as well as

the interaction between them” (Buzan and Waever 2003, 4).

The region of Asia-Pacific has grappled with several elements driving the strategic landscape

over the last few years, witnessing a rekindling of great power competition, power transitions,

and the resurgence of different political regimes in the neighbourhood. Policymakers have been

preoccupied with the US-China trade war since 2018, further mounting the new strategic

environment with routine power plays in the South China Sea, troubled regions like Iran, fresh

forms of political interference in others' domestic polity, and issues in common development

(Atlantic Council, 2021). Scholars' and policymakers' debates constantly define and redefine

systemic uncertainties. Primarily, ‘the new age of uncertainties’ is defined through heightened

pluralism (Acharya, 1997, 320). In the simplest words, it implies multiple actors, multiple

power centres, multiple vectors, and multiple factors with traditional and non-traditional

insecurities (Stanzel, 2018, Goh, 2020). Identifying threats such as terrorism, cyber or

extremists, and a growing range of traditional security actors is as crucial as it is to increasingly

recognise the regional security complexes augmented by non-traditional issues like poverty,

migration, ageing demographic, pandemics, social alienation, climate change, food insecurity,

energy crisis, and so on (Buzan and Waever, 2003). Additionally, The American withdrawal

and the Chinese rise have opened a pandora's box consisting of dilemma, unreliability, and

instability.

The end of US primacy in the Asia-Pacific has generated a greater resort for self-help with a

do-it-yourself attitude (Goh 2020). This is best exemplified in the Republic of Korea’s (ROK)

President Moon Jae-in's pursuit of détente with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

(DPRK) in 2018-2019. Such pursuits were expedited by systemic vulnerabilities surrounding

President Obama's fractional pivot to Asia and President Trump's erratic engagements in the

Asia-Pacific, thus bearing greater costs of uncertainty and unreliability amongst US allies.

South Korea faced a blowback from the Trump administration in the form of cancellations of

military drills and trade rifts; however, the resolve towards inter-Korean peace and stability in

relations constitutes a stronger drive for a self-help model in the new multipolar world order

(Kim and Jo 2018). Correspondingly, Japan's quick resolve despite the US withdrawal from

the TPP and growing suspicions of US commitments in regional institutional frameworks have

resulted in intellectual and entrepreneurial leadership in spearheading the Comprehensive and

Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) with the remaining member

states sans the US (Solis and Mason 2018). Such systemic uncertainties for allies like Japan

have compelled the late Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and other consecutive leaders to

pursue rapprochement with hostile neighbours such as China, despite historical and territorial

conflicts. The two leaders revived bilateral summits to promote free and fair-trade practices

(Perlez 2018).

Self-help governance and models of constructive engagement are evident in the interaction of

the 'spokes' in the network system by creating mutually beneficial relationships in the regional

satellite, contrary to sustaining through an alliance system (Stanzel 2018). Such foreign policy

and governance models are met with a plethora of minilateral and multilateral cooperation. A

lesser-known, Australia-Singapore military engagement has contributed to a broader strategic

security partnership to help Singapore construct new training facilities and increase the size

and rotations of troops between the two nations (Graham 2016). Some academics and political

commentators have further suggested that self-help and minilateralism, increasingly practised

by US allies and partners, have attempted to restructure their other security relations with great

powers in the system (Wilkins 2011; Behringer 2013; Rajagopalan 2021).

Lastly, the growing importance of regional dynamics as the United States' systemic dominance

is increasingly challenged. Not only do we have competing regional imaginaries, but also,

competing great powers. Geopolitics is a way of looking at the world that considers the

connections and interplay between political power, geography, social systems, and cultural

diversity (Goh 2020). Thus, geopolitical competition simmers down to determining the

imaginaries of collectivism, and community is the most important. There are three competing

imagined Asia-Pacific today: ‘Asia-Pacific, (continental) Belt and (maritime) Road, and Indo-

Pacific' (Goh 2020, 6). There are other subs, trans, and regional projects, but these remain the

most important imageries due to the resources committed to them.

The Future of Asia-Pacific in the New World Order

Binary choices or strategic hedging appears, evidently, as the simplest options, given the

numbing statistic of the sheer size of the American and the Chinese economy. However, the

region's complex security reality, with the inclusion of multiple middle powers, tells a different

compelling story. Working together in various institutional frameworks and engaged in multi

track diplomacy, middle powers such as Japan, India, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea,

Malaysia, Indonesia, and Vietnam can affect the regional balance, with some allies assuming

a diminished role for the preservation of the western liberal order (Emmers and Teo 2015).

Supposed or potential informal alliances between such nations statistically reassert the new

regional complexities.

“Consider, for instance, the possibility of a different quadrilateral: Japan, India,

Indonesia, and Australia. All four have serious differences with China and reasonable

(and generally growing) convergences with each other when it comes to their national

security. They happen to be champions of an emerging Indo-Pacific worldview. And

they are hardly passive or lightweight nations. In 2018, the four had a combined

population of 1.75 billion, a combined gross domestic product (or GDP, measured by

purchasing power parity, or PPP, terms) of US$21 trillion and combined defence

expenditures of US$147 billion. By contrast, the US has a population of 327.4 million,

a GDP of US$20.49 trillion and defence spending of US$649 billion. For its part,

China’s population is 1.39 billion, it has a US$25 trillion economy, and its defence

budget is US$250 billion” (Medcalf 2019).

After all, speculation about the rise of Asia-Pacific middle players in future power-balancing

arrangements is just that, albeit extrapolated from existing numbers and projected trends. It is

one thing to say that various Asia-Pacific alliances could balance China if they all work

together. In reality, breakthroughs in leadership, foresight, and diplomacy are required for

coalitions to harden into any kind of resembling formal alliances: arrangements requiring

reciprocal obligations among stakeholders bolstered by a willingness to take risks for one

another (Zhang and Lebow 2020). Furthermore, it is challenging to determine how loosely

affiliated, plural political systems can compete with authoritative China's ability to mobilise

resources.

Despite the absence of consensus on ASEAN's Centrality, the multilateral forum is debated as

an efficient organisation to settle the territorial and maritime disputes in the South China Sea.

Lee and his colleagues have spent time observing the diplomatic behaviour of middle powers.

Drawing on the thought of ‘bridging,’ ‘arbitrage,’ and ‘brokerage’ demonstrated that middle

powers (Lee, Chun, Shu and Thomsen 2015 4; Pramono et al. 2018), especially Mexico,

Indonesia, Korea (ROK), Turkey, and Australia (MIKTA), is serving as bridge amid great

power and small powers as to the issues of climate change, security challenges, economic

constraints and so on. (Lee, Chun, Shu and Thomsen 2015, 4).

The lack of consensus within ASEAN should not be astounding. It reflects the very essence of

Southeast Asia, consisting of countries with diverse and, at times, varying strategic interests;

as a result, the ten-member bloc's approaches to regional geopolitics are hardly monolithic

(Koh 2021). While all ASEAN member states would encourage the prospects for regional

economic integration and close ties with China in sectors such as trade, investment, and

connectivity, this does not indicate that these states view Beijing from a similar perspective.

Multi-player, Multilayer

States are interacting in a complex game with various stakeholders and components in the

contemporary Asia-Pacific. The expansion of China's economic, military, and diplomatic

activity in the Pacific and Indian Ocean has led to the further emergence of an Asia-Pacific

strategic security complex, in which the actions and interests of one powerful state in one part

of the region affect the interests and actions of others (Paskal 2021). The interests of at least

four major countries — China, India, Japan, and the United States — as well as many other

players, including Australia, Indonesia and other Southeast Asian nations, South Korea, and

more distant stakeholders, intersect in the Asia-Pacific regional power narrative. Hence, the

Asia-Pacific is a multipolar system within which the predicaments of regional order, or

disorder, will be ascertained by the interests and agency of many, as opposed to by one or

perhaps even two powers — the United States and China. The region's most imperative

strategic challenges may be centred on China; however, the region is not in itself.

The compounding reality in the region adds many layers with more players to the complexity

of a multipolar region. Geo-economics, military presence, diplomacy, and a clash of regional

narratives are four elements which stand out, thus shaping the future by blending patterns of

broad competition with elements of cooperation.

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